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Coping with Conflict The Role of the Russian Federation1
Roger E Kanet
Introduction
The revolutionary changes of recent years that resulted in the end of the Cold War the collapse of the Soviet empire 
in East-Central Europe and finally the very dissolution of the Soviet state have had a major impact on the role of 
the Russian Federation the primary successor state to the USSR in coping with regional conflicts While for most 
of the postwar era Soviet leaders had mostly viewed regional conflicts as an opportunity to strengthen their position 
m the global competition with the capitalist West the leadership of the new Russia has taken a very different 
approach As part of the effort to be accepted as a normal world power Russia s leaders have generally played a 
supportive role in cooperating with the United States and other Western states in the effort to contain regional 
conflict
However there exist within Russia strong voices opposed to this policy of accommodation They see it as a 
form of subservience to the West and contrary to Russian interests Moreover as discussed below the policies of 
the Russian Federation toward regional conflicts differ depending upon whether the conflict occurs on the territory of 
the form«* USSR elsewhere m Europe or m the developing world Russia has indicated a willingness to engage in 
unilateral intervention in the first group of cases when intervention is viewed as necessary to pursue Russian 
interests However as we will discuss in some detail m conflicts on the territory of the former USSR Russian 
intervention is likely to exacerbate conflict rather than contribute to its successful resolution Elsewhere in Europe 
and in the developing world where Russian interests are less immediately engaged Moscow s role will likely remain 
less central but more positive in coping with regional conflict In the conflicts on former Yugoslav territory the 
Russian government has under substantial domestic pressure shifted from virtual full support for Western policy to 
a policy more balanced among the protagonists and thus more supportive of Serbia. But overall the Russian role 
has been coordinated with Western policy In the developing world Russia has not been extensively involved in 
formal peacekeeping activities although it has supported UN operations However m an effort to generate hard 
currency earnings it has committed itself to a resumption of the export of military equipment—an activity viewed in 
the United States as a major challenge to long term stability in parts of the developing world
The degree to which the Russian Federation will be able to play a positive role in coping with conflict in 
Europe and in the developing world will depend to a substantial degree on domestic political and economic 
developments in Russia itself and on the outcome of the conflicts on former Soviet territory The ability of the 
current coalition of forces headed by President Yeltsin to retain political power is an important factor this m turn 
is closely tied to its ability to create a functioning economy and a stable political system This is especially 
important because of the continuing though reduced commitment of Yeltsin and his supporters to integration into 
the Western-dominated world community Russian nationalists were they to emerge dominant m the domestic 
power struggle would likely take a much less cooperative approach vis à vis the W est However even should 
extremist forces not come to power m Russia domestic factors will probably limit substantially the freedom of 
action of any Russian government in some of the areas associated with the problem of coping with international 
conflict2
I will argue m this chapter that it is not at all clear at present what role the Russian Federation will actually 
play in the process of coping with conflict either on the territory of the former Soviet state or elsewhere in the 
world. The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant the disintegration of the security regime stretching from central 
Europe to the Pacific that was created and maintained by the Soviet Union It means as well a whole set of
1 This amele will be included in Edward A Kolodaej and Roger E Kanet, eds Coping with Regional Conflict A Global Approach 
which is currently being considered for possible publication An earlier version was presented at a symposium with the same uUe held at 
the University of Illinois m October 1992 The author wishes lo express his appreciauon to the participants in that symposium whose 
comments have helped to improve this version of the paper He also wishes to express his appreciation for funding which made the entire 
project possible. Cosponsors of the symposium and of the book project were the US Institute of Peace the Midwest Consortium for 
International Security Studies the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences the Program m Arms Control Disarmament and International 
Security and International Programs and Studies all of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
2 In his recent amele entitled The Clash of Civilizauons Samuel P Huntington discusses the likely continuing divisions between 
Russia and the West. Foreign Affairs LXXII (3) (1993) 22-49
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challenges to the very existence of the new Russian state and to its security defined increasing to include ethnic 
Russian populations resident in the ‘near abroad 3 While other major state actors will be discussed m this volume 
m terms of their likely contributions to the containment of regional conflict the Russian Federation must be seen as 
much as a potential contributor to or source of regional conflict, as it is as a possible facilitator in coping with 
conflict Perhaps the most to be hoped for is that Russia and the other Soviet successor states will be able to solve 
their own problems without widespread resort to military action and without dragging other members of the world 
community into conflict situations
The Emerging Russian View of a Future W orld Order
Of central importance for the behavior of the Russian Federation toward regional conflict will be the general view of 
Russian leaders concerning the type of world order that they prefer Russia s place in that world, and the means that 
its leaders must employ to accomplish their objectives To this point the Russian foreign policy leadership headed 
by President Bons Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has emphasized its commitment ‘to secure 
Russia s entry into the civilized [world] community” and to enlist maximum support for efforts toward Russia s 
transformation ”4 In their view foreign policy has as a major objective the preservation and expansion of the newly 
emerging democratic institutions m Russia Cordial relations with the West have been expected to bnng relief from 
Cold War burdens and to provide access to Western financial and technical assistance and an entree to the 
international economic institutions seen as important for the economic rehabilitation and long term development of 
Russia. Russia s new leaders also committed themselves to base their relations with other former Soviet republics 
on a full recognition of mutual independence3
To a great degree the foreign policy of Kozyrev has built on and extended that of Eduard Shevardnadze the 
architect of Gorbachev s foreign policy in the late 1980s For Kozyrev and the liberals who have staffed important 
positions m the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia must end its decades of isolation from the Western 
world To do this requires the establishment of effective institutions that will support and nurture the emerging 
democracy and market economy that they see as an integral part of a new Russia Relationships with the outside 
world, whether with former enemies from the capitalist world or the newly independent states that shared the 
experiences of the twentieth century with Russia as part of the USSR must be based on mutually beneficial 
contacts not on coercion or threats of coercion Both Yeltsin and Kozyrev have emphasized cm many occasions the 
desire for Russia to become a ‘normal” great power not just a military power Kozyrev has noted his concern about 
the reemergence of the search for enemies and scapegoats that, he believes will undercut Russia s integration into 
the democratic world **
The concrete expression of this foreign policy line has meant a foreign policy of moderation m relations with 
other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)7 and the Baltic states (although threats and even 
forms of intervention have also occurred) a continued emphasis on strengthening the new economic and political ties 
with the West, and overall support for US and Western policy initiatives However m the second year of Russian 
independence in part as a result of domestic pressures Russian policy became more assertive and less 
accommodating to the W est As relates to regional conflict, the Westem-onented foreign policy of Yeltsin s and 
Kozyrev s has centered on active participation in efforts to strengthen the role of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation m Europe (CSCE )8 and alignment on Western oriented policies in the United Nations. This new role
3 “Near Abroad” is the term used widely in Russia to refer to the other new states that emerged out of the collapse of the Soviet Union
4 Yeltsin on Russian Television February 13 1992 cited in Suzanne Crow Russian Federation Faces Foreign Policy Dilemmas 
RFE/RL Research Report (hereafter RFEIRL) I (10) (1992) 15 See also the interview with Yeltsin in a major Polish daily when he stated
Russia s foreign policy objective is to gain an honorable place in international society and become an open and honest partner for states 
and peoples in the creative and peaceful activity of all mankind Rzeczpospolaa  May 22 1992 translated in Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service—Central Eurasia (hereafter FBIS CE) June 4 1992 pp 16-20
5 Andrei Kozyrev “Russia A Chance for Survival ” Foreign Affairs LXXI (2) (1992) 1-16
6. See Nezavisunaia gazeta March 5 1992 and Izvestna March 31 1992 cited in Suzanne Crow “Russia Debates Its National 
Interests RFE/RL I  (28) (1992) 46
7  O rig inal membership in the Commonwealth of Independent states included eleven new countries Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Moldova, Armenia Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan The three Baltic states and Georgia 
never joined the CIS Since its founding however CIS has lost two of the original members Azerbaijan during 1992 and Moldova in 
summer 1993
8 On the activities of the CSCE m vanous regional conflicts see Konrad J Huber “The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East,” 
RFE/RL H (31) (1993) 30-36
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has led Russia to condemn Seibian policy in the civil war in former Yugoslavia and to follow UN agreements on the 
economic blockade of Serbia and Montenegro
A central component of Russian foreign policy has been support for United Nations efforts at international 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This policy builds on the reassessment of international politics and the place 
of the United Nations that had occurred under Gorbachev who had outlined a plan in late 1988 that included an all 
encompassing system of security” tied into the network of the United Nations system9 In this speech and 
elsewhere Gorbachev and his major advisors called for an alternative world order with fewer weapons and ultimately 
for a system of largely disarmed states. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze repeatedly stressed the need to search for a 
future order of peace for principles and mechanisms of international conflict resolution and for means to settle 
international problems in the post nuclear age In this system the dominant role for military political security 
would fall upon the United Nations
The Soviet réévaluation of the United Nations called for increasing the effectiveness of major organs especially 
a heightened role for the Security Council and the expansion of UN peacekeeping operations the creation of new 
subsidiary organizations to deal with issues such as disarmament arms trading environmental degradation and so 
forth and bolstering the financial base of the organization The Soviets admitted that in the past they had not 
contributed to maintaining an effective international peacekeeping organization They also announced that they 
would henceforth cooperate more fully with UN economic and social organs and become involved in other specialized 
UN organizations of which they had not been members After 1988 the Soviet Union did expand its contacts with 
these organizations and paid off its outstanding debts accrued over the decades by the USSR as a consequence of its 
refusal to pay for UN operations that it opposed
Evidence of the impact of the shift in Soviet policy became clear when the April 1988 agreement on the Soviet 
troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the armistice of August 1988 in Cambodia included provisions for the 
dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces or observers to the two regions Since 1988 the United Nations has played an 
active role in peacekeeping and peacemaking m a number of conflicts Especially important was the role of the 
United Nations m the 1989 settlement on Namibia where it helped to broker negotiations and provided buffer and 
police forces and election monitors Elsewhere the United Nations has played an active role at various levels of 
involvement, in Central America the Western Sahara, and Cambodia10 The shift in Soviet policy and the 
willingness to join with the United States and other Western countries m dealing with regional conflicts has been 
essential to the UN s expanded security role After the joint US-Soviet resolution of 2 November 1989 calling for 
the expansion of practical peace efforts cooperation between the two countries became a central element of the 
environment in which the United Nations was operating
The crisis that broke out in August 1990 after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait tested the strength of this new 
cooperative relationship Immediately after the invasion Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze provided Soviet 
political support for joint United Nations operations Not until after Shevardnadze s resignation in December did 
Soviet policy shift away from complete cooperation with the United States11 Evgenu Primakov a key figure in 
Gorbachev s foreign policy establishment, attempted at the last moment to forestall the attack on Iraq by convincing 
Saddam Hussein to be more compliant But, the attempt failed and Moscow supported US led policy to the point 
were UN backed joint action against Iraq was possible
The point of this bnef discussion is to emphasize the fact that, during the period leading up to the collapse of 
the Soviet state Soviet foreign policy behavior shifted dramatically The Soviet leadership now saw the United 
Nations as an instrument through which to facilitate the achievement of foreign policy objectives—which now 
included the resolution of regional conflicts—and as a forum m which to push its new concepuon of a global order 
based on the peaceful resolution of international disputes
9 See President Gorbachev s speech at the United Nations Pravda December 8 1988 The following discussion of Soviet views and 
policy vis à vis the United Nations draws on Gunther Unser “The United Nations Revaluated [sic] in Geihard Simon ed The Soviel 
Union 1990191 Crisis—Disintegration—New Orientation Foreign Policy (Cologne Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschafthche und 
internationale Studien 1992) pp 118-133
10 As of November 1992 UN peacekeeping operations were active in thirteen countnes and proposed for an additional eight 
countries Eight of the existing peacekeeping operations began after the shift in Soviet policy See U S Central Intelligence Agency 
Directorate of Intelligence Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations 1993 (Washington Central Intelligence Agency 1992 EUR 92- 
10027)
11 See Gerd Lande “Soviet Policy in the Kuwait Conflict as an Indicator of a New Mid East Conception in Gerhard Simon ed. The 
Soviet Union 1990191 pp 165-177 (Note 8)
4 Roger E Kanet
During the first year and a half of its existence the Russian Federation pursued a policy toward the United 
Nations and toward regional conflict resolution largely in line with that developed during the last years of the Soviet 
state Speaking before the Security Council in January 1992 for example President Yeltsin called for the 
strengthening of the organization s capacity to deal with significant international problems including peacekeeping 
He recommended the formation of rapid response mechanisms to permit the United Nations to deal with military 
conflicts as well as the creation of institutions to permit the United Nations to play a role m global economic and 
social processes12 However given the demands placed on the limited resources of the government of President 
Yeltsin to deal with conflicts throughout former Soviet territory Russia has had relatively limited direct 
involvement m peacekeeping operations in the developing world The establishment of bilateral and multilateral 
relations with other former Soviet republics and the attempt to deal with conflicts on former Soviet territory have 
forced a shift in emphasis in Russian policy However as an indication of the importance of the role of the United 
Nations in peacekeeping Russian troops were committed to the UN peacekeeping forces sent to Croatia in spring 
1992 and Russia supported the sanctions voted against rump Yugoslavia in late May 199213
At tl»  official level the foreign policy of the Russian Federation during the first year and a half of its existence 
was built upon the foundations laid by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze during 1987-1991 The vision of a future world 
that has informed Russian foreign policy behavior has been one in which Russia is a full member of an international 
community dedicated to the peaceful resolution of conflict President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev have 
been committed to a policy of binding Russia firmly to the West on the basis of policies of democratization 
demilitarization and deideologization This pnonty in Russian policy has been determined largely by the 
recognition that it is an essential condition for the successful stabilization and restoration of the country s 
economy14
Simultaneously however elements of an expansionist orientation have also been evident m Russian policy 
toward some of the other new states The foreign policy of Kozyrev and Yeltsin has come under severe attack by 
those who advocate a more assertive nationalist approach to dealing with both the near abroad and the W est The 
pressure exerted by these forces has had an impact not only on the general orientation of Russian policy but also on 
Russian behavior in specific regional conflicts—in particular on the manner m which Russia is responding to 
conflicts along its periphery Any substantial increase m the influence of extreme nationalism on domestic and 
foreign policy suggests that Russia will be more a problem than a solution either m reconciling differences between 
the various peoples of the former Soviet Union or in assisting with coping efforts in conflicts elsewhere
Russia and the “Near Abroad”
Regional Conflict in the Former USSR
One of the largely unexpected results of the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union has been the 
outbreak of a senes of regional largely ethnically based conflicts on temtones of the former Soviet Union All 
across the southern reaches of former Soviet temtory from Moldova in the West to Tajikistan m Central Asia, 
people have been dying in the violence associated with the effort to create new states often on temtory inhabited by 
ethnic groups with histoncal animosities toward one another or temtory claimed as part of the patrimonial homeland 
by more than one ethnic group15 For a number of reasons the Russian Federation has been intimately involved m 
most of these new regional conflicts
First, there is the fact that twenty five million ethnic Russians who at independence became members of instant 
minorities in fourteen of the fifteen Soviet successor states are directly involved m a number of the crises This is 
most evident in eastern Moldova where the Russian minority with the support of the Russian Fourteenth Army has 
established a breakaway regime in the so-called Transdnestr Republic and m Crimea where a Russian majority favors
12 See New York Times International February 1 1992 p 5
13 See Suzanne Crow “Russia s Response to the Yugoslav Cnsis "  RFE/RL I (30) (1992) 31-35 See also Suzanne Crow Russia 
Adopts a More Active Policy RFE/RL II (12) (1993) 1-6
14 For an excellent discussion of Russian foreign policy in which these points are developed more fully see Heinz Timmermann 
Profil und Prioritäten der Aussenpohuk Russlands und der Jelzin Berichte des Bundesuislituts fü r  ostwissenschaftliche und
internationale Studien (hereafter BBoiS) 21 (1992)
15 A 1992 study earned out by the Institute of Poliucal Geography m Moscow estimated the existence of 180 territorial disputes 
withm the borders of the former USSR, Moscow News 5 (1992) 6 See also Uwe Haibach “Ethno-iemtonale Konflikte in der GUS 
BBoiS 31 (1992)
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a return of the district from Ukrainian to Russian control16 Elsewhere as in northern Georgia and Central Asia, 
fighting among local competitors for power challenges the security of substantial numbers of Russians resident in 
the area The fact that Russians are involved directly or indirectly m many of the recent conflicts is a major factor 
in the concerns expressed in Moscow for their safety and for active Russian policies to protect them In addition 
however the issues involved in some of the conflicts have already spilled over mto the territory of the Russian 
Federation itself Fighting has occurred in the northern Caucasus where the border between Russia and Georgia cuts 
across extremely complex ethnic boundaries in a region where many mutually hostile ethnic communities are 
currently vying for political identity and some form of pohucal autonomy or even independence
A third issue that differs somewhat from the others is the concern in Moscow about the possible emergence of 
radical Islamic regimes in Central Asia The Russian Federation has signed agreements with the governments of 
several of the countries in this area to provide them with security assistance and Russian troops have played an 
important role m supporting the current government in Tajikistan comprised largely of holdovers from the 
communist regime against Islamic and democratic forces committed to toppling it. In one of the major ironies of 
the post-communist world Russian troops are now challenged in Tajikistan by Mujahedin based m Afghanistan 
The broader concern however is the emergence of revolutionary Islamic regimes along Russia s borders that might 
attract the significant Muslim population of Russia itself
A fourth factor of relevance in explaining the interest of Russia in the conflicts that have broken out in recent 
years along its new southern borders is the view openly expressed by many Russian leaders that Russia as the 
successor of the Soviet Union has a responsibility to assure stability throughout the entire territory of i the former 
Soviet state The claim for the special role of Russia in assuring regional security can easily lead to efforts aimed at 
reestablishing Russian dominance in a region most of which was under Russian or Soviet control for centuries 
This is precisely the charge made by President Kravchuk of Ukraine and the leaders of several other Soviet successor 
states as well as the stated objective of many Russian pohucal figures
Immediately after the dissoluüon of the Soviet Union and the emergence of fifteen independent successor states 
the leadership m Moscow was especially cooperauve on issues related to regional conflicts as it focused its foreign 
policy efforts on normalizing relauons with the West Negouauons efforts at mediauon and the provision of 
peacekeeping forces only m cooperauon with others characterized official policy However parallel to this official 
policy and in line with the strong cnucism of Yeltsin s and Kozyrev s foreign policy menuoned above have been 
the charges of Vice President Rutskoi and others that the Russian government has abandoned the legitimate interests 
of the Russian state and of the millions of ethnic Russians living outside the borders of Russia They have called 
for a much more assertive Russian policy and have m fact, engaged in direct mtervenuon on behalf of one facuon or 
another in several of the regional disputes Because of the weakness of the central government and its inability to 
control the military an occurrence of major relevance m this area has been the independent acuon of local military 
commanders Regardless of officially stated policy for example Lt. General Aleksandr Lebed commander of former 
Soviet forces still present in Moldova, has intervened directly in the civil war in the eastern part of that country In 
Abkhazia local Russian troops have engaged in fighting with Georgian Nauonal Guard forces that were sent to the 
area to put down the secessionist movement Moreover Russian forces have reportedly provided equipment to the 
Armenians fighting the Azeris in and around Nagorno-Karabakh At a minimum the government of President 
Yeltsin is unable to control Russian troops stauoned on foreign territory It is more probable however that the 
government is either looking the other way or providing tacit backing for the mitiauves of local commanders
It is important to recognize that Russian policies on the various conflicts on former Soviet territory are 
occurring within the context of emerging new relationships among the former Soviet republics as they jockey for 
position in the regional and global community While Russia—even the Russia of foreign policy liberals such as 
Yeltsin and Kozyrev—attempts to establish its paramount position in the complex regional system(s) emerging out 
of the former Soviet system leaders in the Baltic states m Ukraine and elsewhere are attempting to assert their 
sovereignty and independence from Moscow This has resulted in some cases in increasing hostility in the 
relationships among the new states of the region In the Baltics the issues concern the continued presence of
16 Over the objections of President Yeltsin the Russian parliament asserted in July 1993 that the Crimean city of Sevastopol 
belonged to Russia not to Ukraine See Suzanne Crow Russian Parliament Asserts Control over Sevastopol RFE1RL II (31) (1993) 37-
41
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Russian troops on the one hand and the treatment of the large Russian minorities on the o ther17 The expanding list 
of «g««1« that divide Russia and Ukraine concern the degree to which the latter is going to be able to function as a 
truly independent state The specific issues of Russia s claims to Cnmea of Ukraine s refusal to transfer to Russia 
long range nuclear weapons based on its territory and of ownership of the Black Sea Reet must all be understood as 
part of the politics of national self assertion It must also be recognized that the growing frictions between Russia 
and its new neighbors can contribute to an increasingly hostile environment in which Moscow s policy is being 
made regarding the conflicts in the near abroad.
One of the responsibilities to which the members of the fledgling CIS committed themselves after the 
organization s creation in December 1991 was to create mechanisms to facilitate the resolution of conflict among and 
within the members states At a meeting of CIS foreign and defense ministers held m Tashkent in July 1992 
agreement was reached on the creation of a CIS peacekeeping unit. Several days later Russian Defense Minister 
Pavel Grachev announced that some Russian troops would be trained specifically as peacekeeping forces for possible 
deployment with UN and O S  peacekeeping units18 However the O S  has not proven to be an effective 
organization For the most part agreements signed are merely that with little if any follow up by the signatories 
In January 1993 the heads of state of the CIS members met m Minsk for their eighth summit, at which seven of the 
countries—excluding Ukraine Turkmenistan and Moldova—agreed to a draft charter to be submitted to their 
respective parliaments for ratification The agreement called for greater cooperation in economic matters including 
especially the creation of a CIS interstate bank There was far less progress made on security matters although there 
was general agreement on the creation of an interstate court meant to adjudicate interethnic and interstate disputes19
As of summer 1993 however hule evidence existed to indicate that the CIS was evolving into an effective 
integrative organization especially in the security area. At a meeting of CIS defense ministers m May Russia 
opposed two draft agreements that called for the creation of unified CIS military forces although five other CIS 
states supported the proposed security organization The Russian representative explained part of Moscow s 
opposition by noting that Russia would have to bear the brunt of the costs of such a force 20 Finally all pretense at 
military coordination within the CIS was dropped in early summer 1993 when Marshal Evgenu Shaposhntkov the 
commander in chief of the CIS joint armed forces resigned to take a high level position m the Russian government. 
Several days later on IS June 1993 it was announced in Moscow that the CIS joint military command had been 
abolished.21
Within the territory of the former Soviet Union Russian efforts to deal with regional or local conflicts have 
occurred at three major levels Most of Russia s mvolvement has been at the bilateral level as for example it has 
attempted to work out arrangements with both Georgia—concerning the fighung in South Ossetia and Abkhazia— 
and Moldova—concemmg the secession of Transdnestr—to bnng a halt to the fighung and to work out a settlement 
of the issues m dispute 22 Russia has also attempted to work through the CIS to deal with some of the conflicts 
occurring on former Soviet territory In Tajikistan for example Russian forces guarding the Tajik-Afghan border 
m accord with a bilateral security agreement, have been joined by a battalion of 500 men from each the four other 
Central Asian states that m 1992 signed a collecuve security agreement within the framework of the CIS 23 Finally 
Russia has also attempted to deal with the more intractable conflicts in collaboration with other outside states 
This has occurred for example in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh
17 In both Latvia and Estonia laws have been passed that make it extremely difficult if not impossible for the vast majonty of 
Russians to gain n tn a n h ip  The Russian delay in withdrawing the remnants of Soviet troops from these countries has been directly tied to 
the  Russian m inority  issue, as has Russia s periodic economic pressure against the Baltic countries A recent example of the latter occurred 
in late June 1993 when all gas exports to Estoma were stopped In condemning Estonia s citizenship laws President Yeltsin reminded 
Estoma of “some geopolitical and demographic realities ” a  ted in Celestine Bohlen Russia Cuts Gas Supply to Estonia in a Protest The 
New York Times June 26 1993 p 4
18 RFE/RL I (31) (1992) 59-60
19 These issues are discussed in some detail in Ann Sheehy Seven States Sign Charter Strengthening CIS RFE/RL II (9) (1993) 
10-14 Two modestly optimistic assessments of the future development of the CIS can be found in Jan S Adams Will the Post Soviet 
Commonwealth Survive7 (Columbus Ohio The Mershon Center at the Ohio State University 1993) and Y un Zhilin “A Future for the 
Commonwealth ” New Times 7 (1993) 13-16
20 RFE/RL News Briefs H (21) (1993) 21
21 See RFE/RL News Briefs II (26) (1993) 7 see also Stephen Foye End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy? 
RFE/RL H (27) (1993) 45-49
22 On the situation m Abkhazia see Elizabeth Fuller “Abkhazia on the Brink of Civil War? RFE/RL I (35) (1992) 1-5 on 
developments m Transdnestr see New Tunes 34 (1992) 13
23 ¡TAR TASS January 25 1993 cited m Sheehy “Seven Sutes Sign Charter p 13
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where both the efforts of the central Soviet government of President Gorbachev and more recently those of both 
Russian President Yeltsin and President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan have failed In mid May 1993 a CSCE sponsored 
plan for the resolution of the conflict m Nagorno-Karabakh was submitted to the governments of the two countries 
involved. The plan which had been worked out by representatives of the United States Turkey and Russia was 
immediately accepted by Azerbaijan and taken under consideration by Armenia« but rejected outright by the self 
proclaimed Nagomo Karabakh Republic 24 Russia has continued its efforts in conjunction with the CSCE to develop 
a workable peace plan for Karabakh
Any discussion of the role of the Russian Federation in conflict resolution or peacemaking on the territory of 
the former USSR must take into account the fncuon mentioned previously in the emerging relationships between 
Russia and the other successor states of the USSR Despite official disclaimers that Russia has no desire to 
reestablish dominance over the newly emerging states Russian leaders have had problems adjusting to the new 
reality in which they are required to negotiate as equals with eûtes in Kiev and Almaty (Alma Ata) rather than 
merely issue instructions as would have occurred m the past This is part of a much larger psychological problem 
of redefining Russia s statehood and establishing a new concept of Russian identity in the words of John Lough 25 
Members of the political opposition m Moscow are clear in stating that Russia s legitimate interests extend to 
developments internal to the affairs of the other post Soviet states Even President Yeltsin who maintains that 
Russia has no intentions of resurrecting its imperial past has problems distinguishing between Russia s interests 
within the Russian Federation and those in the near abroad ” In February 1993 for example he stated that the time 
has come for authoritative international organizations including the United Nations to grant Russia special powers 
as guarantor of peace and stability m this region of the former USSR 26 This and later efforts by Yeltsin and his 
officials at the United Nations and within the CIS to gain approval for what would amount to the nght of unilateral 
intervention by Russia received a very hostile response in Ukraine and in several other new states and a cool 
reception at the United Nations 27
However public expressions by high ranking officials of the goal of recreation of a Russian centered Eurasian 
great power continue to be heard m Moscow In early July for example Presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich 
noted that, except in the Baltics leaders of the former Soviet republics who had pushed for independence were being 
replaced with unproved prospects for future reunion with Russia Russia s current task he asserted is to stabilize 
itself within its current borders and then pursue a policy of gradual economic and cultural expansion into the near 
abroad.”28 This is precisely the type of policy feared by leaders in Kiev and other capitals in the near abroad
Russian policy on regional unrest along its borders is increasingly likely to come into conflict with the interests 
of neighboring states and with the perceptions of acceptable policy m the West, including the United States The 
motivations m Moscow are clear for a more direct and assertive Russian response to what is perceived as growing 
chaos along—and even spilling over—their borders Since negotiations have proven to be ineffective m most of the 
ongoing military conflicts according to a Russian analyst, the view has become widespread among Russian political 
elites—even those around Yeltsin and Kozyrev—that the bloodshed in lands which simply can t qualify as foreign 
tontones must be halted even if that means the direct use of Russian military force *29 There is also the view 
strongly held within the military that the establishment of rapid deployment forces and their successful suppression 
of regional conflict would help to restore the prestige and status of the military There is the added concern that the 
failure of Russia to act forcefully to deal with regional conflicts will invite others to intervene Turkey Iran and 
especially the United States are among those most actively poised to act Marshal Evgenn Shaposhmkov former 
commander m chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces argued in December 199230 Others especially opponents of Yeltsin 
and Kozyrev such as Evgenn Ambartsumov chairman of the parliamentary Committee on International Affairs and 
Foreign Economic Relations have express concern about the possibility of UN intervention This explains in part
24 See RFE/RL News Briefs U (22' (1993) 8 9
25 John Lough “Defining Russia s Relations with Neighboring States RFE/RL II (20) (1993) 53 Also see Lough s earlier article 
“The Place of the Near Abroad in Russian Foreign Policy RFE/RL II (11) (1993) 21-29 and two recent essays by Andrei Zagorski 
“Russlands Beziehungen zum fernen und nahen Ausland and Die Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten Entwicklungen und 
Perspektiven " BBoiS 46 and 50 (1992) respectively
26 In a speech to members of Civic Union fTAR TASS March 1 1993 cited m Suzanne Crow Russia Seeks Leadership in 
Regional Peacekeeping “ RFE/RL D (15) (1993) 28
27 Ibid. See also Arkady Chereshma “Big Brother as an Equal New Tunes 17 (1993) 12-13
28 Novata ezhednevnaia gazeta July 7 1993 cued in RFE/RL News Briefs H (29) (1993) 5
29 Chereshma “Big Brother as an Equal p 13 (Note 26)
30 Radio Rossu December 11 1992 cited in Crow Russia Seeks Leadership p 31 (Note 25)
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their strong opposition to military intervention against Serbia which might then serve as a precedent for future 
intervention on former Soviet territory31
Taken together these factors explain why the Russians have sought support for their role as guarantor of security 
in the region However Russia is not a disinterested bystander in most of the conflicts—witness the role of Russian 
troops in Moldova, Abkhazia Tajikistan and, even Nagorno-Karabakh Regardless of Russian motives—and neo 
imperialist designs simply cannot be discounted, Kozyrev and Yeltsin s claims notwithstanding—some of Russia s 
neighbors have responded very negatively to the prospects of expanded Soviet military involvement throughout the 
region Discussions have already taken place concemmg the establishment of a common security system for Eastern 
Europe that would include the former western republics of the USSR and the former Central European members of 
the Warsaw Pact. According to Dmitry Volsky a liberal Russian commentator [t]he anti Russian direction of the 
planned association of East European states is absolutely clear ” He attributes the plans to nationalist political forces 
m Ukraine 32 Although Volsky is correct that nationalists in some of the new states are motivated by and Russian 
attitudes those attitudes cannot but be reinforced by statements of high level Russian officials including the 
president, which imply a desire to recreate aspects of the old Russian-Soviet empire In other words the Ukrainians 
and other East and Central European leaders are responding to views expressed in Moscow—and to Russian behavior 
patterns that they see as threatening
Besides the talk of a special security role for Russia, there is the fact that Russia has been able to use its 
dominant economic and poliucal position in the region to pressure or elicit cooperation from neighboring countries 
In Belarus President Stanislav Shuskevich has unsuccessfully opposed what he views as a gradual reabsorption of 
Belarus into the Russian sphere Interpreters of the power struggle in Azerbaijan in June 1993 have seen the rise to 
leadership of Heydar Aliyev former KGB chief in Azerbaijan and Moscow Politburo member in the mid 1980s as 
possible evidence of Russian involvement and of an enhanced future Russian role m that country The special 
relationship between Russia and the Central Asian states that has emerged since independence has created a virtual 
patron-client relationship between Moscow and the unreformed governments of the region33
What emerges from this discussion is that the security interests of Russia—especially since they are likely to be 
defined for the foreseeable future to include the welfare of ethnic Russians m the near abroad”—will increasingly 
come into conflict with the interests of at least some neighboring states In other words Russia can be viewed in 
some cases at least, as a likely contributor to regional conflict This is especially true given the relative weakness of 
the government in Moscow and its inability to control the statements and actions of leading political and military 
figures However even those supposedly committed to establishing relations based on mutual recognition of 
national sovereignty have often sounded like Great Russian chauvinists
The unilateral large scale introduction of Russian military forces—especially in the conflicts in the European 
and Caucasian areas of the former USSR—would without doubt exacerbate rather than mitigate regional tensions 
From a Western perspective this is highly undesirable However given the apparent intractability of some of the 
conflicts the concerns m Russia about their outcome and the probable inability or unwillingness of the United 
Nations or other international security organizations to deal effectively with regional conflict on former Soviet 
territory the alternatives to a special” Russian security role seem very limited To this point efforts at institution 
building among the Soviet successor states that might serve to mitigate tensions and facilitate problem solving have 
had very limited results This has been true in virtually all areas—from inter state trade and customs cooperation to 
more broadly based economic and political cooperation The scores of agreements in these areas that have been 
signed by CIS representatives have simply not been implemented Obviously the inability of the states in the
31 INTERFAX December 17 1992, cited m Crow Russia Seeks Leadership " p 31 (Note 25) See also Suzanne Crow 
“Ambartsumov s Influence on Russian Foreign Pohcy RFE/RL II (19) (1993) 36-41
32 Membership would supposedly include Ukraine Hungary Poland the Czech Republic Slovakia Romania Bulgaria the Baltic 
states Belarus Moldova, and possibly Georgia See Dmitry Volsky Eastern Europe—Counterbalance to Russia? New Tunes. 21 (1993) 
22. For a more extensive discussion of this Ukrainian security initiative see Roman Solchanyk “Ukraine s Search for Security ” RFE/RL II 
(21)(1993) 1-6
33 See “Russia and Eurasia Political and Economic Update May 21 1993 Bulle tut The Atlantic Council o f  the Untied States IV 
(3) (1993) 4 “Pressure Grows on Azerbaijan Leader to Quit The New York Tunes June 23 1992 p A3 Elizabeth Fuller Azerbaijan 
Geidar Aliev s Politicai Comeback," RFE/RL II (5) (1993) 6-11 and Bess Brown Regional Cooperation in Central Asia?" RFE/RL II (5) 
(1993) 32-34
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region to work out mutually beneficial relationships in the economic and political arenas does not bode well for to 
then ability to solve security related problems34
Peacekeeping in Europe The Russian Role
As already mentioned Russian policy on international peacekeeping has been built on the foundations created during 
the final years of the Soviet state Russia has generally supported Western initiatives m some cases actually 
committing Russian personnel to UN operations In Europe the United Nations is currently involved m two 
operations These include 2,200 personnel in Cyprus since 1964 to supervise the cease fire and the demilitarized 
zone between Turkish and Greek Cypnot forces and more than 15 000 troops in Croatia since spring 1992 to serve 
as a buffer between Serb and Croat forces The mandate of the Croaban operation has been expanded to include the 
provision of humanitarian aid m Bosma-Herzegovina. Though there has been much discussion within the United 
Nabons and without about the creabon of an intemabonal buffer force for Bosma-Herzegovina, as of August 1993 
no such force has been established
The direct Russian role in peacekeeping operations in Europe has been 1 united However in May 1993 Russia 
cast its first UN Security Council veto—the first Soviet or Russian veto since 1984— on the issue of the financing 
of the UN peacekeeping troops in Cyprus In explaining the Russian posibon on the 14-1 vote Russia s permanent 
representabve to the United Nabons lulu Vorontsov explained that the vote was made on purely pracbcal grounds 
implying that Russia could not afford the addibonal $2 million contnbubon called for m the resolubon Thus the 
$31 million po ’ year UN operabon will conbnue to be financed by voluntary contnbubons35
Russia s mvolvement m the conflicts that have tom the former Yugoslavia has been more extensive and 
complex With the outbreak of fighbng in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 Russia supported the Western posibon 
Besides committing peacekeeping forces to eastern Croatia as part of the UN force the Russian Federabon voted in 
the Security Council on 30 May 1992 for the sancbons against rump Yugoslavia because of the latter s role m the 
fighbng that had by then broken out m Bosma-Herzegovina This vote occurred after Foreign Minister Kozyrev had 
visited Yugoslavia earlier in the month in an attempt to broker a peace settlement.36 The policy came under 
immediate attack m the Russian parliament, where Kozyrev was accused of ignoring even selling out Russia s 
interests m the attempt to curry favor in the W est37 Despite the strong opposibon and a vote of the Russian 
parliament against sancbons President Yeltsin signed decrees in mid July that imposed strict sancbons on 
Yugoslavia in Ime with the UN resolubons During the remainder of 1992 the issue of sancbons against 
Yugoslavia became an integral part of the general debate on Russian foreign policy Indicabons of a possible shift 
m the Russian posibon occurred in late summer when Russia, along with four African states abstained on a UN 
General Assembly vote calling on the Security Council to take further appropriate measures to put an end to the 
fighbng in Bosma-Herzegovina38
In December the Russian parliament approved by a vote of 151 to 5 with thirteen abstenbons the Resolubon 
of the Russian Federabon toward the Yugoslav Crisis which outlined policy changes viewed as essenbal It called 
for sancbons against all three warring parues m Bosma-Herzegovina Russia s use of its veto should the UN 
Security Council entertain the idea of military intervenbon in Bosma-Herzegovina, and the sending of humanitarian 
aid to rump Yugoslavia.39 These and later efforts of the parliament to shift official policy have not succeeded Yet 
they no doubt have influenced the posibon of the Yeltsin government on a number of issues directly related to UN 
mvolvement m former Yugoslavia.
First, Russia has acbvely opposed the mtroducbon of intemabonal troops into Bosma-Herzegovina as either 
peacekeepers or peacemakers While Russian conservabves have opposed such a move as anb Serbian Foreign
34 On these issues see Philip Hanson “The End of the Ruble Zone? RFEIRL I (34) (1992) 46-48
35 Suzanne Crow “Russia Uses UNSC Veto RFEIRL News Briefs II (21) (1993) 4
36 See Crow “Russia s Response and Olga Alexandrova Russland und die Jugoslawien Krise BBoiS 34 (1992)
37 The chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for International Relations Evgenu Ambartsumov argued this in an article in 
¡svestila on June 27 1992. Earlier during the fighting m Croatia opponents of official policy called for support for Russia s historical 
Slavic and Orthodox ally Serbia See Eduard Limonov Russia is Repeating the West s Mistakes in Assessing the Yugoslav Conflict, 
Pravda January 13 1992 p 4 cited in Current Digest o f the Post Soviet Press (hereafter CDPSP) XLTV (2) (1992) 17
38 “Yeltsin Signs Decree on Freezing FRY Relations [TAR TASS July 17 1992 and Orders Stiff Sanctions INTERFAX July 
17 1992, translated in FBIS CE  July 17 1992 p 92 138
39 INTERFAX December 27 1992, cited in Crow Russia Adopts a More Acuve Policy p 3 (Note 12)
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Minister Kozyrev has emphasized the dangers of becoming entrapped in a quagmire comparable to Afghanistan On 
the other hand, Russia was quick to support efforts at a negotiated settlement and even promised to commit Russian 
troops as part of a UN multinational force committed to implementing the Vance-Owen proposals should agreement 
be reached on that rar any other peace plan40
Overall the policy of the Russian Federation has not been directly disruptive to Western efforts to deal with the 
cnses in Yugoslavia. In fact, to a substantial degree Russia has been supportive of UN operations—despite the 
widespread and vitriolic criticism of Russian policy from those associated with the so-called national patriotic 
movement, discussed below Yet, given the strength of domestic atutudes concerning the special relationship 
between Russia and Serbia the Russian government has served as a brake on whatever pressures existed m the West 
for military intervention m Bosma-Herzegovina. Added to this have been the charges that Russian volunteers have 
been fighting on the side of the Serbs m Bosma-Herzegovina and that weapons have been supplied from Russia to 
the Sobs Although the Russian government denies these reports there is evidence that such unofficial activities 
might well have taken place 41
Regional Conflicts in the Developing World 
The Russian Role
During the Cold War the vast majority of the regional conflicts that challenged international security occurred in 
developing countries 42 Throughout that penod the Soviet Union was increasingly involved in the major regional 
confrontations almost invariably allied with local forces that were in conflict with Western supported governments 
or movements Until the mid 1970s Soviet involvement in regional conflicts with few exceptions involved 
support for revolutionary forces that challenged Western supported governments With the nse in the 1970s of 
commumst-onented governments m the developing world however the Soviets increasingly found themselves 
supporting governments that were under attack as in Angola Afghanistan and Cambodia. One of the major 
developments in the new thinking” on foreign policy that characterized the Gorbachev years was the reassessment of 
the both the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of Soviet policy objectives in the developing world The result was an 
increasing Soviet disengagement from the Third World that by late 1991 had resulted in a virtual renunciation of 
earlier Soviet commitments to radical client states and movements—as m Afghanistan Cuba and Cambodia—and a 
substantial reduction m overall Soviet involvement m the developing world that was not overtly beneficial to Soviet 
economic interests 43
The most dramatic illustration of the revolutionary shift in Soviet policy occurred during the Gulf Crisis and 
War of 1990-1991 Although a fundamental improvement m US-Soviet relations had occurred over the course of 
the pnor three years orso the crisis represented a real challenge to these new relations They required Russia s 
abandoning a long standing ally Iraq Even though Russia committed no troops to the Desert Storm operation 
against Iraq and did attempt initially to push for a more conciliatory policy toward Saddam Hussein its general 
support of the invasion and its political support in the United Nations were crucial to the success in driving Iraqi 
troops out of occupied Kuwait
40 For Kozyrev s statement see Stern 7 (1993) 190 cited along with other relevant matenals in Crow Russia Adopts a More 
Active Policy ” p 4 (Note 12) Kozyrev s implied commitment of up to two thousand Russian troops to an international peacekeeping 
force was seemingly contradicted by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev who ruled out the introduction of Russian troops see RFEJRL 
New Briefs H (22) (1993) 4
41 For documentation on this issue see Ibid p 5
42 The author is well aware of the madequacy of the temi “developing countries to categonze the very different states of Asia
Afnca, and I-atm  America. In the absence of a better term he will use it to refer to these countries Despite the explosion of ethnicity based
conflict in former communist countries since 1989 the list of countries in which ethnic or religious conflict is a senous problem is still
dominated by countries in Asia Afnca and Latin Amenca. For example of forty-eight countnes mcluded m a recent listing all but eight 
are in the developing world see David Binder with Barbara Crossette As Ethnic Wars Multiply U S Suives for a Policy The New York 
Tunes February 7 1993 p 12
43 For an overview of Soviet policy toward the developing world see Roger E Kanet The Evoluuon of Soviet Policy toward the
Developing World From Stalin to Brezhnev and “Reassessmg Soviet Doctrine New Pnonues and Perspectives ” in Edward A Kolodziej 
and Roger E Kanet eds The Luruls o f Soviet Power in the Developing World. Thermidor in the Revolutionary Struggle (London
Macmillan 1989) pp 36-61 397-425 and Roger E. Kanet with Garth T Katner “From New Thinking to the Fragmentation of
Consensus in Soviet Foreign Policy The USSR and the Developing World ” in Roger E Kanet Deborah Nutter Miner and Tamara J 
Rester eds Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1992) pp 121-144
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Thus when the Russian Federation launched its independent foreign policy at the beginning of 1992 it inherited 
a reduced set of ongoing commitments and involvements in the developing world As part of its objective of 
cooperation with the world community in facilitating conflict resolution the Russians have continued Soviet 
backing for various UN peacekeeping operations Most significant has been the ongoing support for UN operations 
in Iraq Russian technicians have been included among the UN weapons inspectors engaged m finding and destroying 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in accord with the terms of the cease fire agreement Moreover two Russian 
warships were sent to the Persian Gulf in fall 1992 as part of the UN effort to pressure the Iraqi government into 
observing human rights and fulfilling the terms of the UN resolutions 44
Elsewhere throughout the developing world the Russians have supported UN peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations as in Angola Cambodia and Somalia each of which at one time or other had been a close ally of the 
former USSR In none of these cases however have Russian troops or other personnel been directly employed m 
peacekeeping operations
Although Russian policy within the United Nations has supported efforts to deal with regional conflict in the 
developing world one aspect of overall policy—the resumption of arms exports—has been received in Washington 
with significant concern. This is particularly disturbing because these exports have been motivated almost 
exclusively by a desire to generate hard currency income and not by any concern about the policies of the purchaser 
or the uses to which the armaments might be put The United States has been especially concerned about the export 
of submarines to Iran and rocket fuel to Libya 4S
Russian trade has dropped precipitously since independence as had Soviet trade in the pnor year Arms exports 
had been a major item in Soviet exports generating an estimated two thirds of all hard currency earnings by the early 
1980s 46 In constant 1990 pnces Soviet arms sales (not all for hard currency) were estimated at $17 75 billion or 
38 7 percent of total world armaments exports Four years later they had dropped to less than $4 billion only 17 7 
percent of a much smaller market47
The Russians have emphasized the costs to their economy at a time of deep depression of the various UN 
embargoes to which they are a party Libya Iraq and even former Yugoslavia were all important hard currency 
markets for Soviet weaponry According to the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations UN sanctions cost 
Moscow an estimated $16 billion m lost revenues during 1992 48 This decime is especially detrimental to the 
Russian economy where an estimated 37 million people are tied to the defense sector 49 During 1992 major efforts 
were made to expand Russian arms exports with China India Iran and Turkey as the major purchasers
The hope among some officials is that Russian arms exports might rise to $20 billion per year This income 
it is expected, would go far to keep the defense industry operating and to finance the conversion of the remainder of 
the industry50
Stated objectives about long term arms exports are unrealistically high for the market is simply not available to 
permit such growth However any unrestrained increase in the export of sophisticated weaponry from Russia would 
conflict with US objectives and could jeopardize Western trade and assistance An interesting aspect of this likely 
conflict is that the Russians have already accused the United States of a double standard They note that the US 
percentage of international arms exports has increased dramatically—to ten times the percentage of Russian sales to 
developing countries m 1992—and raise the question whether the United States is attempting to freeze Russia out of
44 See New Times 37 (1992) 5
45 One Kilo-class submarine was delivered to Iran in November 1992 despite strong U S protests and the sale of another two was 
confirmed m May 1993 RFEJRL News Briefs II (20) (1993) 3 In June 1993 the United States threatened legal sanctions against the 
Russian Federation and the cancellauon of plans for space cooperation because of the shipment of rocket fuel from Russia to Libya—a 
shipment held up in transit by the Ukrainian government at the time of writing Michael R Gordon U S Wams Moscow on Sale of Key 
Rocket Fuel to Libya,” The New York Tunes June 23 1993 pp Al A5
46 See Roger E Kanet “Soviet and East European Aims Transfers to the Third Woild Strategic Political and Economic Factors in 
NATO—Economics Directorate, ed External Economic Relations ofCMEA Countries Their Significance and Impact in a Global 
Perspective (Brussels NATO Economics and Infoimation Directorate 1984) pp 171-194 especially p 185
47 Thomas Sachse Russische Rüstungsexporte 1992 Umfang und Orgamsauon Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und 
internationale Studien Aktuelle Analysen 13 (1993) 1-8 see also his longer article Russische Rüstungsexportpohtik 1992 Umfang 
Organisationsstrukturen Perspektiven BBioS 4 (1993)
48 INTERFAX January 20 1993 cited m Stephen Foye Russian Arms Exports after the Cold War RFE/RL II (13) (1993) 61
49 Rossuskie vesti May 22 1992 cited in Keith Bush “Russia s Latest Program for Conversion RFE/RL I (35) (1992) 33
50 See Sachse “Russische Rustungsexportpolibk pp 15-17 (Note 46) and Foye “Russian Arms Exports p 62 (Note 47)
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international arms marketsS1 Given the domestic political and economic importance of arms exports for Russia, it is 
unlikely that the issue will soon disappear In fact it will probably continue to represent an area of concern m 
Russia s relations with the United States
Conclusions and Projections
What emerges from this discussion is a picture of Russian foreign policy and especially the likely future role of the 
Russian Federation in regional conflicts that is far from clear Central to the lack of clanty is the fact that there does 
not exist, yet, a clear definition of Russian interests and Russian foreign policy agreed to by a broad cross section of 
the Russian political elite While policy to this point has been based, m large part, on coordination with the West 
that policy has been under increasing challenge by a substantial portion of the political elite Many call for a much 
more assertive Russian policy even including unilateral intervention m conflicts occurring along the Russian 
periphery The result of these challenges to the initial policies of Yeltsin and Kozyrev has been a gradual but 
visible shift in Russian policy—a policy that now claims a special Russian role on former Soviet territory that is 
less cooperative in the Bosnian conflict and that will probably generate growing friction with the West in parts of 
the developmg world.
The Western-oriented foreign policy vision of Yeltsin and Kozyrev has come under great challenge from others 
who do not share this perspective either in full or m part Included among the opponents are many who hold 
positions of influence within the governmental structures of the Russian Federation In many respects Kozyrev s 
opponents have charged that he just as Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze before him has been so enamored 
with the West that he has abandoned Russia s national interests He has supposedly helped to dismantle Russia s 
military power and has pursued a foreign policy based on weakness both in relations with the West and m relations 
with the other Soviet successor states Russian Federation State Advisor Sergei Stankevich one of President 
Yeltsin s hand picked advisors has argued that much of the blame for the problems m Moldova and elsewhere denves 
from ‘ballroom diplomacy”—that is a policy based not on considerations of power but on smiles and good wishes 
He concludes that the policy of ostentatious weakness and endless ritual conversations is suffering one 
obvious failure after another Today as never before Russia needs people who are able to understand formulate and 
defend its true interests ” Stankevich has called for the direct intervention by Russian troops in both Moldova and m 
South Ossetia, in order to save lives especially those of Russians and envisions the reemergence of a Russian led 
Eurasian power52 Vice President Rutskoi has taken similar even stronger positions on the secessionist struggle in 
Moldova as has Supreme Soviet Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov on the fighting in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Between summer 1992 and early 1993 Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his ministry faced senous challenges from 
the parliament that is dominated by those calling for a more assertive policy The parliament, under the leadership of 
Khasbulatov threatened to strip the ministry of responsibility for relations with the near abroad by creating a 
separate ministry for CIS affairs53 Another challenge to the authority of the Foreign Ministry came from the State 
Security Council and its former chief luni Skokov Members of the Council created by President Yeltsin have 
been among the strongest critics of the policies of the foreign minister54
During 1992 several distinct factions emerged in Moscow whose views on foreign policy differed substantially 
from those of the Democratic Russia group associated with Kozyrev The ‘national patriots** included a growing 
number of form a democrats that had abandoned Kozyrev and Democratic Russia on the issue of Ukraine For them 
the concept of a Ukraine separate from Russia is unthinkable The national patriots differ from the democratic 
liberals primarily on the issue of the reestablishment, in some form of the old empire—at least its Slavic portion
51 See Foye “Russian Aims Exports ” p 66 (Note 47) For current data on arms sales see Richard F Grimmen, Conventional Arms 
Transfers to the Third World 1985-1992 (Washington Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress CRS Report for 
Congress 93-656F 1993)
52 Sergei Stankevich “Viewpoint The State Made Manifest, Rossuskata gazeta June 23 1992 p 1 translated in CDPSP LXIV 
(26) (1992) 1-2 See also Stankevich s direct response to Foreign Minister Kozyrev So Far No One has Succeeded in Completely 
Elim inating  Force from the Arsenal of Poliucs Izvestua July 7 1992 p 3 translated in CDPSP XLTV (27) (1992) 10-11
53 See Pavel Golub “The Creation of a Separate Ministry for Commonwealth Affairs May be a Political Mistake ” Izvestua July 24 
1992, p  7 translated in CDPSP XUV (30) (1992) 1
54 In the wake of his victory in the May 1993 referendum President Yeltsm fired Skokov who had strongly opposed many of his 
policies hi June 1993 Marshal Shaposhmkov former commander m chief of joint CIS forces was appointed to head the Council, see 
Foye, “End of the CIS Command (Note 20).
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In the words of the philosopher limi Borodai a spokesman for this group I can say frankly that I am an 
imperialist. I believe in the resurgence of the Russian empire after Golgotha 55
The differences over foreign policy within the Russian political system have been matched by great differences 
on domestic policy and by the power struggles between Yeltsin and his opponents that culminated in the referendum 
of May 1993 Civic Union the political faction that initially focused its disagreements with Yeltsin on economic 
policy has called for a much more assertive Russian foreign policy m protecting Russian minorities and in forcmg 
Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan to turn over their nuclear weapons36 To the nght of Civic Union are the truly 
authoritarian and nationalist groups that oppose the rapid introduction of a market economy favor an authoritarian 
political system and advocate the reestablishment of the Soviet-Russian empire
The attacks on the Yeltsin government have had an impact m the foreign policy field, as is witnessed by the 
general hardening of Russian policy positions on issues associated with both the far and near abroad. ’57 By early 
1993 Russian policy had shifted perceptibly on a number of issues including especially those related to 
peacekeeping On the matter of the fighting in former Yugoslavia the Russians raised the issue of possible 
sanctions against Croaua and strongly opposed any international intervention against Serbia As part of an effort to 
have Iraq pay its outstanding debt to Russia Yeltsin instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to improve relations 
with Iraq and to work to reduce tensions in US-Iraqi relations38 On the issue of regional conflict in the new states 
along Russia s borders Yeltsin and Kozyrev mounted a campaign to gam world recognmon for Russia s special role 
in resolving these conflicts Moreover by early 1993 Russia was taking a much more assertive position in its 
disputes with the Baltic states over the issue of Russian minority rights
Perhaps more important even than these specific modifications m Russian policy has been the emergence of a 
changed foreign policy framework The Foreign Ministry s revised foreign policy concept first published in early 
December 1992 and submitted in final form to the parliament in March 1993 gives much greater significance to 
relations with the ‘near abroad” and to the status of ethnic Russians than had earlier official foreign policy 
proclamations It also emphasized far more the significance of Asia m future Russian policy and downplayed 
somewhat the emphasis on relations with the West a point also emphasized by President Yeltsin m a speech in 
early 199339
By now it should be evident that the policies of 1992—a period when the Russian leadership focused almost 
exclusively on relations with the West and on cooperation with the United States—were only temporary Although 
the concept of Russian statehood and of the nature of Russia” is an issue of major debate in Moscow it is likely 
that any government in Moscow will be much more nationalist and assertive in the future than was the case during 
the first year of independence
Already by early 1993 Moscow s policy had shifted rather significantly on a variety of issues In most cases the 
shifts were viewed with concern by Russia s neighbors and indicated, at a minimum a lack of sensitivity among 
Russian leaders to the security concerns of these countries As one Western analyst has stated of the democratically 
oriented forces in Russia, the danger is that Moscow s efforts to prevent conflict m the near abroad may simply 
provoke i t  Just as the Westemizers of the nineteenth century did not conceive of Russia as anything other than an
55 Iura Borodai “Totalitarianism Nash sovremennik (July 1992) p 130 cited in Vera Tolz, “The Burden of the Imperial Legacy 
RFEIRL l í  (20) (1993) 43 For a categorization and analysis of forms of Russian nationalism see Astnd S Tuminez, Russian Naitonalism 
and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy unpublished paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science 
Association Washington D C September 2-5 1993
56 See, Alexander Rahr Russia The Struggle for Power Continues RFE/RL II (6) (1993) 1-9
57 Evidence of this shift can be seen in Yeltsin s announcement in December 1992 that de facto control over Russian foreign policy 
would be placed in the Foreign Policy Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council see Suzanne Crow Processes and 
Policies RFE/RL II (20) (1993) 50 Moreover Evgenii Ambartsumov Chairman of the parliamentary Committee for International 
Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations and one of the harshest of Kozyrev s critics noted in March 1993 that it was no longer necessary 
to replace Kozyrev as foreign minister since he was pursuing policies supported by the parliament ¡TAR TASS March 13 1993 cited in 
John Lough “Defining Russia s Relations with Neighboring Sutes RFE/RL II (20) (1993) 57 For an assessment of the role of 
Ambartsumov in Russian foreign policy see Suzanne Crow Ambartsumov s Influence on Russian Foreign Policy RFE/RL II (19) (1993) 
36-41
58 See Crow “Processes and Policies pp 50 52 (Note 56)
59 See “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation translated in FBIS USR 93-037  March 25 1993 pp 1-20 On the 
near abroad” see pp 3-5 on the importance of Asia see pp 12-14 Yeltsin s speech was on Russian Television January 25 1993 and is
cited in Crow “Processes and Policies ” p 52 (Note 56)
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empire today s democratic Russian leaders still appear to distrust instinctively the eligibility for mdependence and 
statehood of much of the near abroad. ”60
Although the United States is likely to accept a leading Russian role in Central Asia because of its concern for 
Islamic fundamentalism and the potential political influence of Iran m the region the same is not likely in Europe 
Russian efforts to impose settlements m Moldova or Georgia or Russian attempts to coerce the Baltic states or 
Ukraine are likely to be opposed by the United States and its West European allies Already by summer 1993 a New  
York Tunes editorial called upon Western governments to make clear to Russian nationalists that continued military 
meddling in the politics of non Russian republics could lead to economic isolation There is no future in dreaming 
about the past.”61
Elsewhere m the world Russia s interests will probably diverge increasingly from those of the United States and 
other Western states The historical ties to Orthodox Serbia the desire to profit from armaments sales to Iran and 
Libya, and to improve relations with Iraq—these and other issues may introduce friction into Russian-US relations 
This is not to argue that confrontation of the sort that characterized the global competition between the USSR and 
the United States is likely to reemerge What it means however is that the US image of a new world order if 
such an unage still exists is likely to be challenged by a resurgent Russia—even if democratic forces remain in 
control but especially should strongly nationalist oriented political groups attain power
What emerges from this examination of the place of the Russian Federation m regional international 
peacekeeping is that everything depends on Russian domestic political and economic developments Unless the 
economy is turned around the democratic forces are likely to come under greater challenge from the nationalists who 
should they come to power would likely pursue a much more aggressive foreign policy—one that might be 
committed to reestablishing Russia as a global counterweight to the United States and might attempt to recreate a 
political unity of large parts of former Soviet territory Yet even a more democratically oriented Russian leadership 
is likely to be less cooperative with the United States than it has been in the first year and a half of Russian 
mdependence Russian interests as perceived in Russia, will take precedence over deference to the West, which is in 
part the result of expectations of aid m determining the orientation of Russian policy These interests will very 
probably diverge from those of the West in a number of important areas
Russia will focus most of its foreign policy energies on the near abroad where it may well be as much a 
source of conflict as a contributor to conflict resolution Russia s ability to play a constructive role in coping with 
regional conflict beyond the boundaries of the former USSR will depend upon the success of Russia and the other 
Soviet successor states to solve their own problems associated with state building in multi ethnic environments 
with creating the constitutional and legal contours of post-communist polities and with restructuring functioning 
and competitive economies out of the legacy of the collapsed centralized economy of the former USSR
60 Lough “Defining Russia s Relations p 60 (Note 56)
61 A New Russian Empire? The New York Tunes August 1 1993 p 14
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